La guerra ruso-ucraniana y el futuro del orden mundial
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.38180/rpdi.v0i173.331Resumen
La guerra entre Rusia y Ucrania se desarrolla en un contexto de declive del orden mundial con una amplia difusión del poder en el sistema, en el cual la principal motivación de los actores internacionales parece ser la competencia. Se trata de un período de transición, caracterizado por el resquebrajamiento de las instituciones de gobernanza global y de los principios de apertura económica, cooperación en seguridad y solidaridad democrática. El presente trabajo intenta dilucidar de qué manera y a qué nivel la guerra ruso-ucraniana, junto a otras dinámicas que vienen operando en el contexto internacional desde hace dos décadas, podría influir en la configuración de un nuevo orden mundial; qué características debe tener ese nuevo orden; y cuál debe ser el rol de los actores en el mismo. A partir del análisis de las causas del conflicto, se plantea la necesidad de definir un nuevo orden más benigno, que reconozca las distintas configuraciones institucionales y políticas en el sistema, además de preservar las condiciones necesarias para atender los principales desafíos globales, promover la prosperidad económica y minimizar los riesgos de una gran guerra.
Referencias
Anglesey, A. (2022). Russian Death Toll in Ukraine Overtakes American Losses in Vietnam: Kyiv. Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/russian- death-toll-ukraine-war-overtakes-american-losses-vietnam-1752220
Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. (2022a). Agresión contra Ucrania. 2 de marzo de 2022, A/RES/ES-11-1. https://digitallibrary.un.org/ record/3965290/files/A_RES_ES-11_1-ES.pdf
Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. (2022b), Consecuencias humanitarias de la agresión contra Ucrania. 24 de marzo de 2022, A/RES/ ES-12. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3966630/files/A_RES_ES-11_2- ES.pdf?version=1
Babic, M. (2020). Let’s talk about the interregnum: Gramsci and the crisis of the liberal world order. International Affairs, 96(3), 767-778.
Bildt, C. (2022). This is best way to counter Putin’s nuclear threats. The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/10/10/ putin-russia-nuclear-threat-deterrence/
Bown, C. (2022). Russia’s war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline. https:// www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/russias-war-ukraine-sanctions- timeline
Congressional Research Service. (2022). Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R45861. pdf
Daalder, I. (2022). Ivo Daalder says NATO enlargement didn’t go far enough. The Economist, https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/04/09/ivo- daalder-says-nato-enlargement-didnt-go-far-enough
Davidson, K. y Sutton, S. (2022). Globetrotting and oil capping, Politico Pro, https://subscriber.politicopro.com/newsletter/2022/08/08/globetrotting-and- oil-capping-00050250
Dixon, R. (2022). Russia’s airstrikes, intended to show force, reveal another weakness. The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/2022/10/14/russia-missiles-infrastructure-war-ukraine/
Dixon, R. y Abbakumova, N. (2022). Russia is grabbing men off the street to fight in Ukraine. The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/2022/10/16/russia-mobilization-men/
Edmondson, C. y Cochrane, E. (2022). The Senate overwhelmingly approves
$40 billion in aid to Ukraine, sending it to Biden. The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/19/us/politics/senate-passes-ukraine- aid.html
Fazal, T. (2022). The Return of Conquest? Foreign Affairs, (May/June
, 101(3), 20-27.
Financial Times. (2022). Henry Kissinger: ‘We are now living in a totally new era’ [Entrevista a Henry Kissinger]. Financial Times, https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=6b89jcNqgJo
Fried, D. y Volker, K. (2022). The Speech In Which Putin Told Us Who He Was. Politico, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/02/18/putin- speech-wake-up-call-post-cold-war-order-liberal-2007-00009918
Friedman, T. (1998). Now a Word From X. The New York Times, https:// www.nytimes.com/1998/05/02/opinion/foreign-affairs-now-a-word-from-x. html
Fukuyama, F. (2022). A Country of Their Own. Foreign Affairs, (May/June
, 101(3), 80-91.
Galen Carpenter, T. (2022). Did Putin’s 2007 Munich Speech Predict the Ukraine Crisis? Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/commentary/did- putins-2007-munich-speech-predict-ukraine-crisis
Gates, R. (2014). Duty. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Haass, R. (2021). El retiro de elección de Estados Unidos. Project Syndicate, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/americas-withdrawal-of- choice-by-richard-haass-2021-08/spanish
Haass, R. (2022). The Dangerous Decade. Foreign Affairs, (September/
October 2022), 101(5), 25-38.
Huntington, S. (1999). The Lonely Superpower. Foreign Affairs, (March/ April 1999), 78(2), 35-49.
Ikenberry, J. (2018). The end of liberal international order? International
Affairs, January 2018, 94(1), 7-23.
Inter-American Development Bank Group. (2022). The Economic Consequences of the War in Ukraine for Latin America and the Caribbean, July 2022, 33.
International Monetary Fund. (2022). World Economic Outlook: Countering the Cost-of-Living Crisis. https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/ WEO/2022/October/English/text.ashx
Kagan, R. (2022). The Price of Hegemony. Foreign Affairs, (May/June
, 101(3), 10-19.
King, C. (2008). The Five-Day War. Foreign Affairs, (November/December
, 87(6), 2-11.
Kissinger, H. (1994). Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Kissinger, H. (2014). World Order. New York: Penguin Press.
Kramer, A. (2022). Despite Its Barrage of Missiles, Russia Still Loses Ground in Ukraine. The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/14/ world/europe/ukraine-russia-missiles.html
Krauthammer, C. (1991). The Unipolar Moment. Foreign Affairs, 70(1), 23-
Krauthammer, C. (2002). The Unipolar Moment Revisited. The National Interest, (Winter 2002), 70, 5-17.
Lizza, R. y Daniels, E. (2022). POLITICO Playbook: Biden warns of nuclear ‘Armageddon’. Politico, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/ playbook/2022/10/07/biden-warns-of-nuclear-armageddon-00060904
Masters, J. (2022). Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia. Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine- conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia
Mearsheimer, J. (2022). John Mearsheimer on why the West is principally responsible for the Ukrainian crisis. The Economist, https://www.economist. com/by-invitation/2022/03/11/john-mearsheimer-on-why-the-west-is- principally-responsible-for-the-ukrainian-crisis
Miller, C., Scott, M., y Bender, B. (2022). UkraineX: How Elon Musk’s space satellites changed the war on the ground, Politico, https://www.politico. com/news/2022/06/09/elon-musk-spacex-starlink-ukraine-00038039
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2008). NATO decisions on open-door policy. https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/04-april/e0403h.html
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2022a). Enlargement and Article 10. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2022b). NATO’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm
Nye, J. (2010). The Future of American Power. Foreign Affairs, (November/
December 2010), 89(6), 2-12.
Nye, J. (2021). With China, a ‘Cold War’ Analogy Is Lazy and Dangerous. The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/02/opinion/biden- china-cold-war.html
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2022). The world economy is slowing more than anticipated. https://www.oecd.org/ coronavirus/en/data-insights/the-world-economy-is-slowing-more-than- anticipated
Organización de las Naciones Unidas. (2022). Los referéndums de Ucrania no son una verdadera expresión de voluntad popular, ni legales según el derecho internacional. https://news.un.org/es/story/2022/09/1515341
Peregil, F. (2022). La movilización que Putin no quería: jóvenes que huyen del llamamiento a la guerra hasta en bicicleta. El País, https://elpais.com/ internacional/2022-09-26/la-movilizacion-que-putin-no-queria-jovenes- que-huyen-del-llamamiento-a-la-guerra-hasta-en-bicicleta.html
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense. (1992). Defense Policy and Strategy. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb245/doc03_extract_ nytedit.pdf
Putin, V. (2007). Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ transcripts/24034
Putin, V. (2021a). On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. http:// en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181
Putin, V. (2021b). Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board. http:// en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/deliberations/67402
Putin, V. (2022a). Address by the President of the Russian Federation. http:// en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/67828
Putin, V. (2022b). Signing of treaties on accession of Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics and Zaporozhye and Kherson regions to Russia. http:// en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/69465
Rodrik, D. y Walt, S. M. (2022). How to Build a Better World Order. Foreign Affairs, (September/October 2022), 101(5), 142-155.
Rustamova, F. y Tovkailo, M. (2022) Putin Can Afford at Least Two More Years of War. Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/putin- can-afford-least-two-more-years-war
Sachs, J. (2022a). Ukraine Is the Latest Neocon Disaster. JDS, https://www. jeffsachs.org/newspaper-articles/m6rb2a5tskpcxzesjk8hhzf96zh7w7
Sachs, J. (2022b). The Great Game in Ukraine is Spinning Out of Control. JDS, https://www.jeffsachs.org/newspaper-articles/ d2hlnp24c7hyewetypd6rjgfesszm4
Sanahuja, J. A. (2022). Guerras del interregno: la invasión rusa de Ucrania y el cambio de época europeo y global. Anuario CEIPAZ 2021- 2022, Madrid, Fundación Cultura de Paz, pp. 41–71.
Sly, L. (2022). Russia’s escalation won’t turn tide of the war, experts say. The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/15/ ukraine-military-situation/
Snyder, T. (2022). Ukraine Holds the Future. Foreign Affairs, (September/
October 2022), 101(5), 124-141.
Stanovaya, T. (2022). Putin’s Apocalyptic End Game in Ukraine. Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/putin- apocalyptic-end-game-ukraine
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2022). SIPRI Yearbook 2022. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/yb22_summary_en_ v2_0.pdf
Strange, S. (2004). States and Markets, New York: Continuum.
The Economist. (2022a). Shooting Shaheads. The Economist, 445(9317), 41-42.
The Economist. (2022b). Are sanctions on Russia working? The Economist, 444(9310), 7.
Tyler, P. (1992). U.S. Strategy plan calls for insuring no rivals develop. The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/world/us-strategy-plan-calls-for-insuring-no-rivals-develop.html
U.S. Department of Defense. (2022). Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/28/2003087045/-1/-1/1/ UKRAINE-FACT-SHEET-SEP-28.PDF
U.S. Department of State. (2022). U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine. https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/
Will, G. (2022). The nuclear threat may be graver now than in the Cuban missile crisis. The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/2022/10/12/putin-nuclear-threat-cuban-missile-crisis/
Wörner, M. (1990). The Atlantic Alliance and European Security in the 1990s - Address by Secretary General, Manfred Wörner to the Bremer Tabaks Collegium, https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1990/s900517a_e.htm
Zakaria, F. (2022). The best China strategy? Defeat Russia. The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/06/09/biden-administration- defeat-russia-contain-china-ukraine-war/
Publicado
Número
Sección
Licencia
Derechos de autor 2023 Samuel Ashcallay Samaniego

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0.






